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LIABILITY OF COMMON CARRIERS UNDER
THE ACT TO REGULATE COMMERCE
The liability of common carriers for loss, damage, or injury
to shipments has always been a fertile source of litigation in
the courts, and particularly in this country. The importance of
the subject both to carriers and shippers is manifest. One ele-
ment in furtherance of such controversies has been the varying
conditions in the different kinds of bills of lading; another has
been the volume of trade and commerce, and a third has been
the conflicting decisions of the courts, even where the bill of
lading conditions have been identical in language.
The first attempt by Congress to deal with the subject in so
far as rail carriers were concerned' was by the Act of June 29,
19o6. By that act there was inserted as a part of the act to
regulate commerce an enactment, which has come to be known
as the Carmack amendment.
2
There have been numerous decisions by the Supreme Court
passing on this amendment. Its constitutionality has been
1 Secs. 4281 to 4289, inclusive, Revised Statutes, U. S., and Act Feb. 13,
1893 (Harter Act), provide with respect to limitation of liability of
common carriers by water.
The Carmack amendment reads:
"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation company
receiving property for transportation from a point in one state to
a point in another state shall issue a receipt or bill of lading
therefor and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any
loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which such
property may be delivered or over whose line or lines such property
may pass, and no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt
such common carrier, railroad, or transportation company from the
22
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affirmed and the advantage of the public policy as declared by
Congress therein has been pointed out.3
By the Act of March 4, 1915, the first paragraph of the Car-
mack amendment was changed so as to read:
"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation
company subject to the provisions of this act receiving
property for transportation from a point in one state or
territory or the District of Columbia to a point in another
state, territory, District of Columbia, or from any point
in the United States to a point in an adjacent foreign
country shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor,
and shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any
loss,- damage, or injury to such property caused by it or
by any common carrier, railroad, or transportation com-
pany to which such property may be delivered or over
whose line or lines such property may pass within the
United States or within an adjacent foreign country when
transported on a through bill of lading, and no contract,
receipt, rule, regulation, or other limitation of any charac-
ter whatsoever, shall exempt such common carrier, rail-
road, or transportation company from the liability hereby
imposed; and any such common carrier, railroad, or trans-
portation company so receiving property for transportation
from a point in one state, territory, or the District of
Columbia to a point in the District of Columbia, or from
any point in the United States to a point in an adjacent
foreign country, or for transportation wholly within a
territory shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt
or bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon,
whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or
not, for the full actual loss, damage, or injury to such
property caused by it or by any such common carrier,
railroad, or transportation company to which such prop-
erty may be delivered or over whose line or lines such
liability hereby imposed: Provided, That nothing in this section shall
deprive the holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy
or right of action which he has under existing law.
"That the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company
issuing such receipt or bill of lading shall be entitled to recover
from the common carrier, railroad, or transportation company on
whose line the loss, damage, or injury shall have been sustained
the amount of such loss, damage, or injury as it may be required
to pay to the owners of such property, as may be evidenced by
any receipt, judgment, or transcript thereof."
The leading cases are: Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills,
219 U. S. i86; Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491; Wells
Fargo v. Neiman-Marcus, 227 U. S. 469; Boston & Maine v. Hooker,
233 U. S. 469; Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe v. Robinson, 233 U. S.
173; Missouri, Kansas & Texas v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412.
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property may pass within the United States or within an
adjacent foreign country when transported on a through
bill of lading, notwithstanding any limitation of liability
or limitation of the amount of recovery or representation
or agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill of
lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff
filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and any
such limitation, without respect to the manner or form in
which it is sought to be made is hereby declared to be
unlawful and void: Provided, however, That if the goods
are hidden from view by wrapping, boxing, or other
means, and the carrier is not notified as to the character
of the goods, the carrier may require the shipper to specif-
ically state in writing the value of the goods, and the
carrier shall not be liable beyond the amount so specifically
stated, in which case the Interstate Commerce Commission
may establish and maintain rates for transportation, depen-
dent upon the value of the property shipped as specif-
ically stated in writing by the shipper. Such rates shall
be published as are other rate schedules: Provided
further, That nothing in this section shall deprive any
holder of such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy
or right of action which he has under the existing law:
Provided further, That it shall be unlawful for any such
common carier to provide by rule, contract, regulation,
or otherwise a shorter period for giving notice of claims
than ninety days and for the filing of claims for a shorter
period than four months, and for the institution of suits
than two years: Provided, however, That if the loss,
damage, or injury complained of was due to delay or
damage while being loaded or unloaded, or damaged in
transit by carelessness or negligence, then no notice of
claim nor filing of claim shall be required as a condition
precedent to recovery."
It will be observed that in the recent enactment there is much
more language than in that for which it is substituted; there
are additional provisions to be found in the three last provisos.
It is manifest even from a casual reading that the first sentence
of the Cummins amendment may be justly criticised for its
patent ambiguity due to surplusage, tautology, and redundancy.
Since the passage of the Cummins amendment there has been
much doubt and controversy concerning the interpretation there-
of; many doubts have been raised from selfish motives. The
Interstate Commerce Commission, whose duty it is to interpret
and construe in the first instance,4 after a hearing on the subject
'If the Commission err in its interpretation, resort may be had to the
courts (L C. C. v. Humbolt SS. Co. ex reL, 224 U. S. 474).
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expressed tentatively its views5 and has made a report in respect
thereto (No. 49, Ex parte; 33 I. C. C. 682). With the views
there expressed many attorneys, both representing carriers and
shippers, are not in accord, particularly in respect to the first
proviso.
There is no apparent controversy concerning the meaning of
that part of the Cummins amendment reading:
"Provided further, That nothing in this section shall
deprive any holder of such receipt or bill of lading of
any remedy or right of action which he has under the
existing law: Provided further, That it shall be unlawful
for any such common carrier to provide by rule, contract,
regulation, or otherwise a shorter period for giving notice
of claims than ninety days and for the filing of claims
for a shorter period than four months, and for the insti-
tution of suits than two years: Provided, however, That
if the loss, damage, or injury complained of was due to
delay or damage while being loaded or unloaded, or
damaged in transit by carelessness or negligence, then no
notice of claim nor filing of claim shall be required as a
condition precedent to recovery."
There may be some doubt concerning the proviso relating to
a carrier's rule making the limitation of filing suits for claims
two years. It is true that a period of limitation for filing claims,
as provided by a carrier's rule, has been upheld,( but a limita-
tion in respect to instituting suits seems to be granting too great
powers. Suits against carriers must now be brought within two
years; suits by carriers for undercharges are governed by the
state statutes of limitations.'
"The Commission has been urged to some expression in the premises.
It has held a hearing on this subject, and the questions there discussed
have been argued on briefs. From the best information it has been pos-
sible to obtain and the consideration it has been able to give this matter
within the limited time available, the Commission expresses tentatively
the views hereinafter indicated." (33 I. C. C. 685.)
Commissioner Hall concurred in the report, but dissented as follows:
"I concur in this report, but do not agree with the construction placed
upon the proviso in the Cummins amendment in so far as it extends the
exception created by the proviso beyond the meaning of the words used
in their usual sense." (33 I. C. C. 698.)
'Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Harriman Bros., 227 U. S. 657.
'The Interstate Commerce Commission in its 27th and 28th Annual
Reports recommended legislation to make a uniform statute of limitations,
three years. In the present Congress several bills for the purpose are
pending, including H. R. 651 by Mr. Keating.
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It may be noted in passing that where the amendment as a
whole uses the words "Provided further" the words following
are a distinct, although related provision; and, when the term
"Provided, however," is used, the words following indicate an
exception to a general rule as stated in the language immediately
preceding. This distinction is in line with and seems to mark
the boundaries of an exception to a general rule and an indepen-
dent provision. The net effect of "Provided further" is "and";
and an exception to a general rule is introduced by "Provided,
however". Whether this selection of terms was by design can-
not, of course, be stated; nevertheless, it serves to aid in the
interpretation and construction of the enactment.
Probably no better way in which to begin to consider the
meaning of that part of the enactment in serious controversy,
namely, the body and first proviso of the amendment, is to con-
sider what was the situation prior to its enactment; and, in the
pending matter, inasmuch as the Carmack amendment and the
Cummins amendment are in respect to the rule of liability for
common carriers much the same, it will be found profitable to
begin with the situation as it was shortly prior to the passage
of the Carmack amendment, June 29, 19o6.
At that time Congress had not legislated with respect to the
liability of carriers by rail.8 Their liability for loss, damage and
injury to property entrusted to them had been determined either
by the general common law as declared by the Supreme Court
of the United States, or by the supposed policy of a particular
state, or by the statute law of a particular state.9 There was
therefore no uniformity, for the three methods were and could
but be essentially different. Uniformity could only be achieved
when Congress had acted. And Congress not having acted in
this behalf, state statutes, policies and decisions determined the
liabilities even with respect to interstate shipments. When Con-
gress legislated all state laws and policies were superseded.1 0
Congress now having acted, it will not be profitable or advan-
tageous to consider the liability of carriers as determined by the
different states or enter into any consideration of the conflict
' Congress had legislated with respect to the liability of carriers by
water; see note I, supra.
'Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, citing Hart v. Penn. Ry., 112 U. S.
331; Penn. R. R. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477; Chicago, etc. Railroad v.
Solan, i69 U. S. 133.19Adains Express Co. v. Cronhtger, 226 U. S. 491.
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of state decisions. Undoubtedly the Cummins amendment will
and should be interpreted in the light of the general common
law and with an eye single to the interpretation of its forerunner,
the Carmack amendment. Although the liability of common
carriers is an extraordinary one, yet in "a fair, just and reason-
able agreement""- the carrier might under the general common
law limit its liability in respect to:
I. The initial carrier, or the carrier on whose line the loss,
damage or injury might occur:
II. One or more causes12 by reason of which loss, damage
or injury might come to the goods, which are:
(a) those arising from acts of God;
(b) those caused by the public enemy;
(c) those arising from the acts of public authority;
(d) those arising from the acts of the shipper;
(e) those arising from the inherent nature of the
goods;
(f) those arising from the negligence of the carrier.
III. The amount for which the carrier would hold itself liable,
in the event the loss, damage or injury was occasioned by or
where it had not exempted itself.
Within these three fields the carrier might reserve its rights
in respect to liability; in two it could exercise its powers fully;
in one it had under all decisions only limited powers.
The carrier most frequently entirely limited its liability for
loss, damage or injury to its own line; the initial and succeeding
carriers after they had severally accomplished the transportation
over each of their rails became mere forwarders, 3 and were no
longer liable as common carriers.
'Hart v. Penn. Ry., 112 U. S. 331: "It is just and reasonable that such
a contract [limiting liability], fairly entered into, and where there is no
deceit practised on the shipper, should be upheld." Adams Express Co. v.
Croninger, 226 U. S. 491: "But the rigor of this [common law] liability
might be modified through a fair, reasonable and just agreement with
the shipper which did not include exemption against the negligence of
the carrier or his servants."
"It is deemed unnecessary for present purposes to discuss in detail
what constitutes each of these causes.
'Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. i86, affirming the
general rule of law that unless there is a clear contract to carry through,
the liability of each carrier ends with delivery to the next carrier.
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The advantage of a public policy,--and it should be recalled
that the general common law of liability of common carriers is
that as determined by the courts and not by statute, which permits
a limitation of liability, was thus expressed by the Supreme Court
in Railroad v. Lockwood (17 Wall. 357): "A modification of the
strict rule of responsibility, exempting the carrier from accidental
losses, where it can safely be done, enables the carrying interest
to reduce its rates of compensation; thus proportionately reliev-
ing the transportation of merchandise and produce from some
of the burden with which it is loaded."
With respect to the three heads above mentioned under which
common carriers might limit their ability, they had the power
in making rules and regulations and in promulgating bill of
lading conditions to limit their liability with respect to each or
all of them. It was not unusual, in fact, it was the rule, that
carriers should limit their liability to their own lines; almost
universally carriers limited their liability to one or more of the
causes which might cause loss, damage or injury to goods
entrusted to them; with respect to many commodities carriers
were in the habit of fixing the amount beyond which they would
not be liable. 14 In shipments of general merchandise, the limita-
tion of liability was generally confined to the places and causes;
in very many instances, however, such as live stock, household
furniture, and some of the more valuable articles, the limitation
of liability dealt not only with the place and causes but also with
respect to the amount or value, being predicated on a stated
value per unit.
The effect of the Carmack amendment upon the liability of
common carriers as heretofore set forth, may be ascertained both
from a reading thereof and a consideration of the decisions of
the Supreme Court. It required (a) the issuance of a receipt
or a bill of lading, (b) for the property received for interstate
transportation, (c) from one state to another, and (d) fixed the
liability for loss, damage or injury thereto on the initial carrier,
(e) if caused by it or other handling carrier; (f) carriers could
not exempt themselves from the liability imposed; (g) existing
remedies were preserved; (h) a remedy over was given the
" Formerly, the articles as to which the carrier limited its liability as
to amount or value was very large; at the present time the list is quite
small; such has been the change as to freight; by express, however,
value has been and is the chief element by which to determine rates, and
the amount of liability.
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initial carrier against the negligent carrier. In the decided cases,
which cover all forms of transportation as well as detailed causes
for which the carrier was to be held liable, the amendment has
been held constitutional, limitations of liability as to causes and
amount (but not as to place or negligence) have been held
valid and the court has pointed out the advantages arising under
the amendment to the benefit of the public of "oneness of
charge, continuity of transportation and primary liability of
receiving carrier to shipper, with right of reimbursement from
the guilty agency in the route."'-5
The changes wrought by the Cummins amendment, the Car-
mack amendment considered, can be most easily pointed out *by
a comparison of the language of the two. The italics below
represent the words added by the Cummins amendment to the
Carmack amendment:
"That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation
company subject to the provisions of this act receiving
property for transportation from a point in one state or
territory or the District of Columbia to a point in another
state, territory, District of Columbia, or from one point
in the United States to a point in an adjacent foreign
country shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and
shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof for any loss,
damage, or injury to such property caused by it or by any
common carrier, railroad, or transportation company to
which such property may be delivered or over whose line
or lines such property may pass within the United States
or within an adjacent foreign country when transported
on a through bill of lading, and no contract, receipt, rule
(or) regulation, or other limitation of any character what-
soever shall exempt such common carrier, railroad, or
transportation company from the liability hereby imposed;
and any such common carrier, railroad, or transportation
company so receiving property for transportation from a
point in one state, territory, or the District of Columbil
to a point in another state or territory, or from a point in
a state or territory to a point in the District of Columbia,
or from any point in the United States to a point in an
adjacent foreign country, or for transportation wholly
within a territory shall be liable to the lawful holder of
said receipt or bill of lading or to any party entitled to
recover thereon, whether such receipt or bill of lading has
been issued or not, for the full actual loss, damage, or
'Atlantic Coast.Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. i86: "The rule is
adapted to secure the rights of the shippers by securing unity of trans-
portation with unity of responsibility."
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injury to such property caused by it or by any such com-
mon carrier, railroad, or transportation company to which
such property may be delivered or over whose line or lines
such property may pass within the United States or within
an adjacent foreign country when transported on a
through bill of lading, notwithstanding any limitation of
liability or limitation of the amount of recovery or repre-
sentation or agreement as to value in any such receipt or
bill of lading, or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in
any tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission;
and any such limitation, without respect to the manner or
form in which it is sought to be made is hereby declared
to be unlawful and void: Provided, however, That if the
goods are hidden from view by wrapping, boxing, or other
means, and the carrier is not notified as to the character
of the goods, the carrier may require the shipper to specif-
ically state in writing the value of the goods, and the car-
rier shall not be liable beyond the amount so specifically
stated, in which case the Interstate Commerce Commission
may establish and maintain rates for transportation, depen-
dent upon the value of the property shipped as specifically
stated in writing by the shipper. Such rates shall be
published as are other rate schedules: Provided further,
That nothing in this section shall deprive any holder of
such receipt or bill of lading of any remedy or right of
action which he has under the existing law," etc.
Unless done in the first proviso above quoted,1 6 the Cummins
amendment subtracted nothing from the Carmack amendment;
changes were by addition, being in the following particulars:-
(a) broadening the transportation to include intra- and inter-
territorial, commerce between a state and a territory and between
a state or territory and the District of Columbia, intra-District
of Columbia and commerce by rail with adjacent foreign
countries (Canada and Mexico) ; (b) strengthening, or attempt-
ing to strengthen the ways in which limitation of liability might
not be practiced, (c) prohibiting contracts as to the amount to
be recovered in the event of loss of the property, and (d) affirma-
tively prescribing the measure or maximum of liability (when
the carrier is liable) by making it for the "full actual loss,
damage or injury."
No one can read the first part of the Cummins amendment
without discerning that the first half of the first sentence and
the second half thereof are much to the same purport. Doubtless
"6The effect and proper interpretation of this proviso is considered,
infra.
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the true meaning and intent of this sentence can be more readily
ascertained by redrafting the sentence into simple language. The
redundant and unnecessary language can be ascertained by cast-
ing the two halves of the sentence as below, the second half
(which is, in a sense, the more comprehensive) being in italics;
Second Half: And any such common carrier,
First Half: That ...... any ...... common carrier,
railroad, or transportation company ...................
railroad, or transportation company subject to the pro-
..................... so receiving property for trans-
visions of this act ........ receiving property for trans-
portation from a point in one state, ... territory, or the
portation from a point in one state or territory, or the
District of Columbia to a point in another state or ter-
District of Columbia to a point in another state, .... ter-
ritory ...................... or from a point in a state
ritory, District of Columbia, or from any point .......
or territory to a point in the District of Columbia, or from any
....... ,I................................ ..........
point in the United States to a point in an adjacent
...... in the United States to a point in an adjacent
foreign country, or for transportation wholly within a terri-
foreign country .....................................
tory ................................................
.... shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor, and
shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt or bill of
shall be liable to the lawful holder thereof .............
lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon, whether such
...... .....,............. ..... .............. .......
receipt or bill of lading has been issued or not, for the full
........................................for......
actual loss, damage, or injury to such property caused by
.any loss, damage, or injury to such propertV caused by
it or by any such common carrier, railroad, or transpor-
it or by any ..... common carrier, railroad, or transpor-
tation company to which such property may be delivered
tation company to which such property may be delivered
or over whose line or lines such property may pass
or over whose line or lines such property may pass
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within the United States or within an adjacent foreign
within the United States or within an adjacent foreign
country when transported on a through bill of lading,
country when transported on a through bill of lading,
notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limitation of the
. . ... ..... . ....................... ... ....... ...
amount of recovery or representation or agreement as to value
o.........o......o...................... ........
in any such recent or bill of lading, or in any contract ........
..; ......................... and no contract, receipt,
rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed with the Interstate
rule, regulation, or ..................................
Commerce Commission; andany such limitation without respect
......................... other lim itation ............
to the manner or form in which it is sought to be made is hereby
......................... *.............. ..o° .. ,. o.. .
declared to be unlawful and void........................
............................ of any character whatso-
ever shall exempt such common carrier, railroad or trans-
.. .: . . . . ................... .....o° . °° . o .... o o..
portation company from the liability hereby imposed.
If only necessary language be used the first part of the
Cummins amendment, including the first proviso, would read as
follows:
'That any common carrier, railroad, or transportation
company (subject 7 to the provisions of this act) receiv-
ing property for transportation from a point in one state,
territory, or the District of Columbia to a point in another
state or territory or from a point in a state or territory
to a point in the District of Columbia, or from any
point in the United States to a point in an adjacent
foreign country, or for transportation wholly within a
territory, shall issue a receipt or bill of lading therefor
and shall be liable to the lawful holder of said receipt or
bill of lading or to any party entitled to recover thereon,
' TThis phrase is not necessary, for the description of the places from
and to which property is to be transported is, in effect, identical with the
language in section i of the act. If the phrase "subject to the provisions
of this act" be retained, the language following it and describing the
kind of transportation could well be omitted.
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whether such receipt or bill of lading has been issued or
not, for the full actual loss, damage, or injury to such
property, caused by it or by any common carrier, railroad,
or transportation company to which such property may
be delivered or over whose line or lines such property
may pass within the United States or within an adjacent
foreign country when transported on a through bill of
lading, notwithstanding any limitation of liability or limi-
tation of the amount of recovery or representation or
agreement as to value in any such receipt or bill of lading,
or in any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff filed
with the Interstate Commerce Commission; and any such
I limitation without respect to the manner or form in which
it is sought to be made is hereby declared to be unlawful
and void; Provided, however, That, if the goods are
hidden from view by wrapping, boxing, or other means,
and the carrier is not notified as to the character of the
goods, the carrier may require the shipper to specifically
state in writing, the value of the goods, and the carrier
shall not be liable beyond the amount so specifically stated,
in which case the Interstate Commerce Commission may
establish and maintain rates for transportation, dependent
upon the value of the property shipped as specifically
stated in writing by the shipper. Such rates shall be
published as are other rate schedules.'
The foregoing provision and the language just used is for the
sake of simplicity only; the language has not been shortened
for the purpose of introducing an unusual, strained or particular
interpretation. What the author has to say in respect to the first
part of the Cummins amendment is as applicable to the longer
draft of the act as to the suggested shorter draft.
After the hearing upon the Cummins amendment the Inter-
state Commerce Commission in its report' stated that the more
important points which seemed to be surrounded with the most
doubt and upon which the opinions of the attorneys so far as
they expressed themselves most sharply conflicted were:
"i. If no changes are made in the existing shipping contracts
and rate schedules, will the higher rates provided therein auto-
matically become lawfully applicable upon the date upon which
the amendment takes effect?" Having in mind that shippers
under the uniform bill of lading had the option to accept or
reject limited liability of the carrier, a lower rate being applicable
to shipments under such liability, the supposed intention of Con-
gress, and that the lawful rates were rates for such limited
No. 49 (Ex parte) In re Cummins Amendment, 33 I. C. C. 682.
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liability, the Commission held that the amendment did not auto-
matically bring into effect the increased rates as applicable to
shipments which are not made subject to the terms of the current
bill of lading.
"2. May the carriers lawfully provide in their tariffs and
rates schedules that their liability shalI/be for the full value of
the property at the place and time of shipment?" The Commis-
sion held that the liability of the carrier may be limited to the
full value of the property as of the time and place of shipment.
"3. Does the amendment to the act apply to export and import
shipments to and from foreign countries not adjacent to the
United States ?" This question was answered in the negative.
"4. In the proviso, 'that if the goods are hidden from view
by wrapping, boxing, or other means, and the carrier is not
notified as to the character of the goods,' what is the proper
interpretation to be placed on the words 'and the carrier is not
notified as to the character of the goods' ?" The decision of the
Commission on this question was predicated upon its interpreta-
tion of the word "character." Holding that character as here
used must include "the true and actual value as stated by the
shipper," substituting "or" for "and," the Commission pointed
out that where a rate is lawfully conditioned on value as declared
by the shipper it is as much the shipper's duty to declare the true
value as it is his duty to declare the name of a commodity ten-
dered for shipment as to which there are differing rates; and said
"that if, in any instance, the shipper declares the value- to be
less than the true value in order to get a lower rate than that
to which he would otherwise be entitled, he violates, and is sub-
ject to the penalty prescribed in section IO of the act; subject
to the same penalty would be the carrier if, having knowledge
that the value represented is not the true value it nevertheless
should accept the shipper's representation as to value for the
purpose of applying the rate."
"5. Do the terms of the Cummins amendment apply to the
transportation of baggage?" This question was answered in the
affirmative.
With the tentative views 9 thus expressed by the Commission,
which have been summarized above, there has been considerable
discord. On the question whether or not the rates for limited
liability (No. i supra) were as a matter of law stricken from
",33 I. C. C. 685; see note 5, supra.
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all tariffs on the effective date of the Cummins amendment there-
by leaving in force and effect only the rates for so-called
"common carrier's liability as at common law," many carriers'
representatives have disagreed with the Commission but have as
yet taken no action seeking an interpretation in accordance with
their views. It would seem that, as the liability of the common
carriers is of no substantially different kind in the Cummins
amendment than in the Carmack amendment, namely, in neither
instance can the carrier contract by any means against its own
negligence and as the present lower rates are for the same limited
liability, the views of the Commission expressed in this 'behalf
are sound.
In deciding that carriers may continue to provide that the
amount of their liability shall be dependent upon the full value
of the property as of the time and place of shipment (No. 2
supra) the Commission seems to have affirmed that carriers
might contract with shippers in respect to the measure of damages
by which to determine what shall constitute and how shall be
ascertained "the full actual loss, damage or injury" to property
caused by carrier's negligence. Fluctuating market prices of
articles entering into commerce have afforded, and doubtless will
afford, opportunities to contest upon this particular point. It is
quite true, as the Commission points out, "The loss or damage
must, apparently, be either as of the time and place of shipment,
time and place of loss or damage, or time and place of destina-
tion." The weight of the decisions at common law was
undoubtedly as of the place of destination at the time when the
goods arrived or at which they reasonably would have arrived.
Furthermore, it would seem to be rather the province of a jury
under proper instructions of the court to determine what shall
constitute the elements or measure of damages in each particular
case. Moreover, permission accorded to the carriers to prescribe
a rule for determining the measure of damages or the elements
of damage seems to be seriously objectionable on the ground that
not only would carriers be permitted to legislate in this behalf but
also require shippers to accept such legislation even though it be
to their serious detriment, and, in effect, contract for the amount
of recovery. It will require, should such a condition be placed
in the bills of lading,20 the decision of the highest court to deter-
"' The Interstate Commerce Commission has no jurisdiction to prescribe
bill of lading conditions, but it may make recommendations in respect
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mine the constitutionality and lawfulness of such a condition; to
the mind of the writer such permission by the Interstate Com-
merce Commission is against the intent of the amendment,
pernicious in its workings and unlawful.
That the amendment does not apply to export and import ship-
ments to and from foreign countries not adjacent to the United
States (No. 3 supra) is too patent for argument. The territorial
scope of the amendment is practically no other or different than
that provided for in section i of the act. Similarly, the applica-
tion of the terms of the amendment to the transportation of
baggage (No. 5 .upra) is well founded, in the light of the bag-
gage provisions of the act, the reports of the Commission and
the decisions of the courts."
The opinion of the Commission in respect to the meaning of
the first proviso (No. 4 supra) is, indeed, subject to serious
criticism. It considered only the effect of part of the language
of the proviso, namely, "that if the goods are hidden from view
by wrapping, boxing, or other means, and the carrier is not
notified as to the character of the goods"; in fact, the whole
effect of the proviso was determined upon the meaning of the
word "character." The Commission invoked but one rule22
with respect to the interpretation of statutes, reading "and" as
"or," remarking that by substituting the latter for the former
the meaning of the proviso is reasonably clear, whereas if the
letter of the statute is adhered to, the meaning is doubtful and
thereto; In the Matter of Bills of Lading, 14 I. C. C. 346. Manifestly,
the conditions of a bill of lading should be in harmony with the law as
laid down by Congress. At the present time, February, 1916, the Com-
mission is holding hearings (I. C. C. Docket No. 4844) to determine
what ought to be the changes in bill of lading conditions that the docu-
ment may conform to the provisions of the Cummins amendment.
"And it is hereby made the duty of all common carriers subject to
the provisions of this act to establish, observe, and enforce * * * *
just and reasonable regulations and practices affecting * * * * the
carrying of personal, sample, and excess baggage." (Sec. I) ; Regulations
Restricting the Dimensions of Baggage, 26 I. C. C. 292; National Baggage
Committee v. A. T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 32 I. C. C. I52; B. & M. R. R.
Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97.
"Perhaps the ignoring of all the canons of interpretation is justifiable,
as "when justices of the United States Supreme Court (or any other
court) divide on statutory construction, the minority rarely have difficulty
in finding well-settled rules of interpretation to support their dissent."
U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Association, 166 U. S. 29o; Pacific Mail SS. Co.
v. Holiffe, 2 Wall. (U. S.) 467.
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difficult to determine.2" It failed to invoke the numerous canons
of interpretation, including the trouble and inconvenience which
might arise from its interpretation; possible hardships were not
mentioned; the unequal operation on goods for which graded
rates are provided and those for which no such rates are in force
was not noticed; nor was there seen the absurdity which results
if the body of the amendment and the proviso mean the same
thing; it did not mention and does not seem to have considered
that the purpose of the act to regulate commerce was to further
and not hamper commerce
2l; it failed to consider the evident
difference between the word "property" in the body of the
amendment and "goods" in the proviso
5 ; it did not indicate
whether or not the proviso was an exception to the general rule
or whether it carried a co6rdinate general rule; it did not take
into consideration the custom, as indicated by the bill of lading
conditions, which is always a help in ascertaining the true mean-
ing of a statute; nor did it attempt to point out whether the
act as a whole, or the first proviso, was enacted fo the benefit
of the public, nor whether some provisions were in derogation
or affirmance of the common law. Though the views of the
Commission were tentatively expressed and although perhaps the
matter should have been presented in a more 
formal way,2
6
consideration of some of these matters might well have been
given.
Agreement with the meaning of the word "character" as held
by the Commission is a matter of relatively little importance,
because so far as it is interpreted, the interpretation is to an
extent sound. The Commission said that the word "character"
as in the proviso "clearly relates primarily to value, or to those
qualities which affect value." In the transportation sense, it
means more; it means in addition to "value," '"great value" and
as well "subject to extra risk." In Railroad v. Lockwood, 17
Wall. 357, goods of a particular class were referred to,--"But
To the mind of the writer, the substitution of "or" for "and" does
not here clarify the language and intent of Congress. If the proviso is
to be read as enacted it makes the condition on which carriers may act
a single one; if, however, the word "or" be substituted the conditions
are two in number and the carrier may act if one only be present.
IT. & P. Ry. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S. 197.
In transportation parlance there is a wide distinction between "prop-
erty" and "goods," the former being more comprehensive than the
latter.
" Suggested in the report, 33 I. C. C. 698.
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the great hardship on th carrier in certain special cases, where
goods of great value or subject to extra risk were delivered to
him without notice of their character, and where losses hap-
pened," etc. Manifestly, Mr. Justice Bradley had in mind that
the word "character" contained at least two elements, in the
disjunctive: "great value or subject to extra risks." Many
articles on which higher rates are demanded (or were demanded)
were not of great value, e. g., molasses and other liquids, which
are liable to ferment, are of no great value but are subject to
extra risk, not only as to their own loss or damage but also as to
damage to other articles in the same car. So also, many articles
of great value are not subject to extra risk or hazard. It is
submitted that the word "character" means either (a) of great
value or (b) of extra risk.
Keeping in mind the three fields within which carriers might
under the general common law limit their liability and also hav-
ing in view the denial by the Carmack amendment of some of
these respects, it behooves one to determine the crucial provi-
sions, the essential mandates, of the Cummins amendment.
Analytically stated the amendment provides:
i. The interstate common carrier
2. shall issue a bill of lading for property received
3. and shall be liable (whether or not bill of lading is issued)
4. to the real party in interest
5. for the full actual loss, damage or injury to property,
6. caused by it or other handling common carrier
7. Notwithstanding (a) any limitation, or
(b) limitation of the amount of
recovery, or
(c) representation or agreement as
to value:
8. Provided, however, That if the goods are
(a) hidden from view by wrapping,
boxing, or other means, and (or?)
(b) the carrier is not notified as to the
character of the goods,
9. the carrier may require the shipper to
IO. specifically state in writing
ii. the value of the goods,
12. in which event the carrier shall not be liable for a greater
amount than so stated
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13. and the Commission may establish and maintain2 7 rates
14. dependent upon the value of the property
15. as specifically stated in writing by the shipper.
16. Such rates shall be published as other rates.
The chief objection to the Commission's interpretation of the
proviso now under consideration concerns the duty of carriers
to provide a regulation, requiring that shippers must state in
writing the actual or true value of the goods to be transported,
if and when the carrier has elected to provide graded rates
dependent on value. The Commission has tentatively so stated
the carrier's duty. The effect has been to require dealers in
articles, the rates on which are predicated on different values,
to declare such a value that thereunder the movement thereof has
been seriously impeded; inconvenience and annoyance have been
caused to the users of transportation facilities; the right to
insure valuable shipments, while not denied as a matter of law
is as a matter of fact. A passenger accompanied by his baggage
which exceeds the usual value of $ioo.oo is required to pay
excess rates. The users of express facilities instead of valuing
parcels at $5o.oo each,--the usual express valuation, and carry-
ing his insurance, as has been largely the custom, must pay
greater transportation charges; these transportation charges far
exceed the transportation charges with $50.00 limitation of lia-
bility per package plus the insurance charges for full value.
Where lines of trade and industry use to any considerable extent
transportation by freight and the carrier has provided graded
rates according to values, the previous custom of a stated valua-
tion per unit has been changed so that instead of the stated
valuation, much greater rates are required for the transportation
of goods which in truth exceed in value those for stated valua-
tion. Not infrequently the shipper either by freight or express,
and more frequently the passenger with his baggage, does not
know and cannot tell the actual or true value of the shipment;
the difficulty of stating actual or true values is in many instances
insurmountable. Again, if the shipper or passenger shall state
a value in excess of a true value at the time of making the
shipment, he could not recover that amount but only an amount
determined by the verdict of a jury under proper instructions
of the court; in the supposed case he would naturally be limited,
'The use of the verbs "establish and maintain" is not accurate. The
power of the Commission is to "determine" and "prescribe" (Sec. 15);
the former is a judicial word and the latter a legislative one.
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not to the valuation he had stated although the property might
be to him worth such amount. Moreover, the present interpre-
tation produces the result that the policing of shipments, a duty
cast upon carriers, could not be effectually done. Graded
rates are provided for but a few articles; many other simi-
lar articles, being of high value or subject to serious market
fluctuations, are carried at one rate. To enforce the sug-
gested rule must necessarily produce unjust discrimination
against the article for which graded rates are carried.
The true meaning of that portion of the Cummins amendment
which fixes the liability of carriers would seem to be: The rule.
That for loss, damage, or injury to property transported by an
interstate carrier caused by it or other handling carrier, the initial
carrier shall be liable for the full actual loss, damage, or injury
notwithstanding any attempt in any way, method or manner to
limit the liability or contract in respect to the amount of recovery.
The exception. But under certain circumstances, to-wit, if the
goods are hidden from view by wrapping, boxing, or other
means, and the carrier is not notified as to the character of
the goods, and the carrier has elected to make graded rates
dependent upon the value of the property (or may hereafter so
elect), then and under such two contingencies, the shipper may
be called upon to specifically state in writing the value of the
goods, which value as so stated shall constitute the measure or
limit of recovery.
28
It seems clear that for shipments of property the liability is
for the full actual loss, damage, or injury; and it is equally clear
that subject to the election of the carrier to provide graded
rates for the shipment of concealed goods, the shipper is per-
mitted to fix the value of the shipment for transportation pur-
poses. If the proviso requires the stating of true or actual value
it is not an exception to the general rule provided in the body
of the amendment; in the latter the measure of liability is the
full actual loss, damage, or injury, and in the former, if the
'In cases where there is an agreed amount of recovery in the event
of loss, damage and injury, the ground on which the shipper cannot
recover a greater amount is that of estoppel (Missouri, Kansas and
Texas Ry. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657; Wells Fargo & Co. v. Neiman-
Marcus, 227 U. S. 469); where the amount is fixed in the tariffs, not
only is estoppel a ground but also there must be a strict observance of
the tariffs by the shipper and carrier (Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry.
v. Robinson, 223 U. S. 173, and cases there cited).
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shipper must state actual or true value, the measure of liability
is none other than the full actual loss, damage, or injury to
goods. Naturally Congress cannot have imputed to it an intent
to pass a positive enactment and add a proviso which, while in
somewhat different language, would mean in truth and in practice
the same thing; such a thought would be averse and contrary to
all methods and canons of interpretation; this proviso as with
other provisos must mean something different or other than that
which precedes it.
It has long been the custom for carriers to limit their liability;
such limitations of liability, except as against carrier's negligence,
have been upheld whenever no imposition has been practiced by
the carrier and there has been "a fair, just and reasonable agree-
ment." All of the cases prior to the Carmack amendment have
turned upon the nature of the agreement for limited liability,
notice of the limitation, and the policy of the state with respect
to such limitations. Since the Carmack amendment and eVen
since the Elkins act all parties have been bound by carrier's pub-
lished tariff provisions and the law has presumed that neither
the carrier nor the shipper could violate the rules and regula-
tions carried in such published tariffs.29 It is on this ground that
the limitations in bills of lading, schedules, tariffs and classifi-
cations have been upheld.
Heretofore limitations have been promulgated by carriers;
shippers were forced to abide by them or file formal complaint
before the Interstate Commerce Commission attacking their rea-
sonableness. Congress seems to have had in mind that if goods
are concealed and their character is not kn6wn to the carrier
and carriers elect to provide graded rates thereon according to
value, the shipper may limit the liability of carriers, and at the
same time to have provided that carriers shall not in any way
limit their liability or contract for the amount of recovery.
The number of articles for which carriers by freight have
provided graded rates is very small; by express, on the other
hand, rates are predicated particularly on value 0 ; rates for bag-
gage are included in the passenger fare but increased or excess
baggage rates are carried in carriers' tariffs for baggage of
'Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173, and
cases there cited.
'Express companies' bills of lading are usually headed: "This com-
pany's charge is based upon the value of the property, which must be
declared by the shipper."
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greater than the value per unit, generally $ioO.oo per first-class
ticket.
That part of the decision of the Commission which lays down
the law that if one shall state less than the actual or true value
for the purpose of getting a lower rate, he shall be subject to
the penalties of section IO of the act, is open to criticism. Section
10 seeks to prevent, under heavy penalty, one shipper securing
an undue preference or advantage,-not to say rebate, in the
describihg of property for transportation; certain forms of mis-
description are prohibited. But in the pending matter a form
of misdescription (as it were) is allowed and permitted under
certain circumstances by a later act, to-wit, the stating of one
element of description of the property, the value; the purpose
of it "is not to change the nature of the undertaking of the com-
mon carrier, or limit his obligation in the care and management
of that which is entrusted to him. It is to describe and define
the subject matter of the contract so far as the parties care to
define it, for the purpose of showing of what value that is which
comes into the carrier's possession and for which he must account
in the performance of his duty as a carrier."3 1 The carrier has
provided graded rates; if it shall be held for one amount, its
rate is a certain figure; if held for larger amount, it demands
a greater rate. A shipper has his choice and both rates are open
to all. And his choice or election is now no different from what
it was in the past. The shipper has now become the active and
inducing party to the contract, while formerly he was the passive,
if not the inactive, party; under the pr6viso of the amendment
the carrier is called upon to notify the shipper that graded rates
have been provided, thereafter the shipper fixes and determines
what value he shall put upon his goods. If the lower rate and
lower valuation shall be selected by one shipper and another shall
select the higher rate with corresponding higher valuation, each
may and probably has acted in good faith and according to his
own judgment as shall befit his individual circumstances. Such
difference in election has never heretofore been considered unlaw-
ful. If it is now to be considered unlawful there is a complete
reversal of all previous decisions; if the stating of other than
true or actual value is now a crime under section IO, the same
universal practice and custom has been a crime ever since the
enactment of the section.
'Bernard v. Adams Express Co., 205 Mass. 254, cited with approval
by the Supreme Court in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491.
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Where for the transportation of a particular commodity there
have been provided graded rates, the several rates are open to
each and every shipper of the- article. The lowest rate must
necessarily include and be presumed to include the charge for
transporting the article (cost of transportation to the carrier plus
a profit) plus a charge for an insurance against loss, damage, or
injury caused by the carrier. This rate would not include any
insurance against the loss, damage, or injury to goods occasioned
by causes other than carrier's negligence; similarly, the next
highest rate would not include any insurance against such causes;
and so, also, if there should be provided several graded rates
for increasing values. If the shipper be required to specifically
state actual or true values he necessarily now pays for something
which he does not get, namely, a rate or charge for an unassumed
risk; a statement that the more expensive horse or article, say
of the value of $250.00, is more liable to loss, damage, or injury
by carrier's negligence than if worth $I5O.oo, would not be
borne out by the facts; the doctrine or law of chance would
apply to things of the same class alike independent of their
value. This law or doctrine of chance would not, however, be
applicable to all carriers; the chances that the A. & B. Railroad
would be negligent are far greater (or less) than if the L. &
M. Railway were the prospective carriers.
The requirement that actual or true value must be stated nul-
lifies, if it does not deny, the right of shippers to carry insurance
on goods while in transit. Insurance is much less annoying in
the event of loss than the making of claims against carriers;
there is no great delay in settlement, no jewing down of the
amount due, no attempt to avoid liability, no dispute as to causes.
The insurance usually carried covers loss, damage, or injury from
any and all causes, including carrier's negligence. A part of
the transportation charge is for carrier's negligence; so that the
shipper carrying a policy of insurance pays two charges for total
indemnity, an amount in the rate for transportation against car-
rier's negligence and another amount in the insurance premium
for that and other causes., When the shipment is actually and
truly valued, there being no more chance of loss than if
"released," the added rate (whatever the amount) cannot be a
payment for added insurance for the reason that the indemnity is
only against one of several possible causes, to-wit, carrier's negli-
gence. Let this instance explain: Assume a shipment of silk (for
which in certain territory there are graded rates), the actual value
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of which is $3.oo per pound. Custom for many years released
silk to $I.oo per pound. The rate at the latter value is, say, 50
cents per hundred pounds; at true or actual value it would under
tariff provisions be 75 cents. The difference ostensibly represents
an insurance against carrier's negligence,-and yet there is no
possibility of any difference in that respect in the two shipments.
Each is equally liable to loss, damage, or injury due to carrier's
negligence. The shipper pays for nothing more in the second
than in the first case; in each the indemnity is against carrier's
negligence. Assuming two such shipments, he cannot recover, in
the event of carrier's negligence (on the ground of estoppel)
more than the amount at which the shipment has been valued;
in an actual or true value case, he can recover full value, if lost
by the same cause. But in both instances the shipper frequently
carries insurance. With insurance in both cases and assuming
loss by reason of carrier's negligence, the goods being released,
the amount which could be recovered would be received from
two sources: a portion from the carrier and a portion from the
insurance company; in the true or actual value case the amount
recovered would be either from the insurance company or from
the carrier, the right of subrogation being preserved. With
insurance in both cases and loss being occasioned by acts other
than carrier's negligence, the amount recovered in both the
released case and the true value case would be from the insurance
company. The notorious trouble and annoyance in securing
claims from carriers and the difficulty in satisfactorily proving
whether the loss, damage, or injury was occasioned by carrier's
negligence or other causes, leads one to believe that prudence
demands the carrying of insurance with a right on behalf of the
shipper to fairly stipulate for the amount of recovery, if and
when the goods are concealed.
But it may be urged that the greater the value of an article
the greater the value of the service and hence a greater rate
may be reasonable. Aside from a consideration of this aca-
demic and economic statement (interesting but not of practical
use), present rates are not so constructed.3 2 It is true that value
is one element of freight rates but such rates are not measured
only by that standard; value is an important element in express
rates but other elements serve to fix the reasonableness thereof.
'For example: Bar iron and steel take the same rates as expensive
laundry and electrical machinery. The elements of rates exceed 3o in
number.
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It seems clear that the proviso does not by its language,
whether liberal or strict rules of interpretation be used, require
shippers to state actual or true value of hidden or concealed
goods. To justify such an interpretation as has tentatively been
given the proviso, one must insert in front of the word "value"
the words "actual or true" and strike therefrom what would
be surplusage the words "and the carrier shall not be liable
beyond the amount so specifically stated." To sustain such
interpretation words must be both read out and read in.
Nor can it be urged successfully that the making of graded
rates and shipments thereunder tends to a want of care by the
carrier. This question is foreclosed by the decision in Hart v.
Pennsylvania Railroad, 112 U. S. 331,-in which the court also
stated the public policy which justifies limitation of value of ship-
ments. The court said:
"The limitatioh as to value has no tendency to exempt
from liability for negligence. It does not induce want of
care. It exacts from the carrier the measure of care due
to the value agreed on. The carrier is bound to respond
in that value for negligence. The compensation for car-
riage is based on that value. The shipper is estopped
from saying that the value is greater. The articles have
no greater value, for the purposes of the contract of trans-
portation, between the parties to that contract. The car-
rier must respond for negligence up to that value. It is
just and reasonable that such a contract, fairly entered
into, and where there is no deceit practiced on the shipper
should be upheld. There is no violation of public policy.
On the contrary, it would be unjust and unreasonable, and
would be repugnant to the soundest principles of fair deal-
ing and to the freedom of contracting, and thus in conflict
with public policy, if a shipper should be allowed to reap
the benefits of the contract if there is no loss, and to
repudiate it in case of loss."
The Interstate Commerce Commission clarified and modified
its tentative views (33 I. C. C. 682) in a circular from the sec-
retary's office83 and in its report irl Iowa State Board of Railroad
Commissioners v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 36
I. C. C. 79.
Some doubt apparently existing whether or not the stating of
value for all shipments was required by the Cummins amend-
ment as interpreted by the Commission, the circular above
referred to said:
'The circular was issued August 17, 1915.
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"There is no provision in the act to regulate commerce,
including the Cummins amendment, that requires a decla-
ration as to the value of property shipped in interstate
commerce. Nor has the Commission issued any ruling
that requires such declaration.
"The Cummins amendment does, however, provide that
if the goods are hidden from view by wrapping, boxing,
or other means and the carrier is not notified as to their
character, 'the carrier may require the shipper to specif-
ically state in writing the value of the goods.' In such
cases rates and charges for transportation, dependent upon
the value of the property shipped as specifically stated in
writing by the shipper, may be established and main-
tained."
The prerequisites for the application of section IO were stated
to be:
"First, the election of the carrier to require a shipper to
state in writing the value of the goods; second, the exist-
ence of graded rates or charges dependent upon the value
of the property shipped, and, third, that the shipper shall
knowingly and wilfully by false statement as to the value
obtain or attempt to obtain transportation of such property
at less than the regular rates." 34
In its report above referred to in addition to deciding that the
whole system of released rates based on agreed valuations as
distinguished from actual value had been abolished, the Com-
mission fixed and prescribed "average values" for live stock.35
'A strange if not uncertain part of this statement is that where there
have in the past been graded rates, each and all of them have been con-
ceded "regular," and not only such but also lawful, proper and beneficial.
The syllabus reads:-
i. The Cummins amendment has in effect abolished in interstate
commerce the whole system of released rates based on agreed
valuations as distinguished from actual value.
2. Applying to the present record the principles enunciated in
the Cummins amendment, 33 I. C. C. 682: (a) That, taking each
class of animals by itself and making due allowance for the mini-
mum, maximum, and average values of each as shown by this
record, the scheduled valuations carried by these defendants in
their live stock shipping contracts are unjustly and unreasonably
low and not representative of the average actual values of the
animals shipped thereunder; (b) that defendants' rates for the
transportation of certain specified animals, the actual values of
which do not exceed the amounts set forth in the report, are, and
will be for the future, unreasonable to the extent that such rates
exceed the present rates based upon the present scheduled valua-
tions; (c) that defendants' excess rates for excess valuations are
unjustly and unreasonably high; and (d) that reasonable rates for
the transportation of any animal of actual value exceeding the
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Manifestly, this is not in strict conformity with its former deci-
sion in No. 49, Ex parte, unless shipments of live stock fall under
the body of the amendment as property and not under the
proviso as hidden or cohcealed goods. "Goods" in the trans-
portation sense does not generally include live stock. And, yet,
the body of the amendment does not provide for, but in truth
prohibits, limitations of liability and contracts for amount of
recovery! The rules laid down seem to have been made ex
necessitate rei.
The courts have always appreciated the advantages of limit-
ing the liability of carriers by contracting for the amount to be
recovered whenever the agreement in that behalf has been "fair,
reasonable and just"; in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226
U. S. 491, the court said:
"It has, therefore, become an established rule of the
common law as declared by this court in many cases that
such a carrier may by a fair, open, just and reasonable
agreement limit the amount recoverable by a shipper in
case of loss or damage to an agreed value made for the
purpose of obtaining the lower of two or more rates pro-
portioned to the amount of the risk."
The advantages of such a public policy has been referred to
in an excerpt from Railroad v. Lockwood, supra; the same
thread runs through all of the more recent cases including those
interpreting the Carmack amendment. Such a public policy per-
mits carriers to make rates proportioned to the risk assumed,
relieves transportation of a portion of the charges therefor, helps
to reduce the cost of living and is in furtherance of commerce.
Fixing the amount of recovery for shipments lost, damaged or
injured has frequently been considered a limitation of liability.
The recent cases, however, construe such an agreement as a con-
tract as to what the property is in reference to its value and not
as a limitation of liability. In Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,
(226 U. S. 491), the court approved the following language
from Bernard v. Adams Express Co., 205 Mass. 254, as follows:
"But such a contract as we are considering in this case
is not an exemption from liability for negligence in the
management of property within the meaning of the
amount specified in the report will exceed said present rates by not
more than 2 per cent. of said present rates for each 5o per cent.
or fraction thereof of actual value over and above that named in"
the report.
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statute. It is a contract as to what the property is, in
reference to its value. The purpose of it is not to change
the nature of the undertaking of the common carrier, or
limit his obligations in the care and management of that
which is entrusted to him. It is to describe and define the
subject matter of the contract, so far as the parties care
to define it, for the purpose of showing of what value
that is which comes into the carrier's possession, and for
which he must account in the performance of his duty as
a carrier. It is not in any proper sense a contract exempt-
ing him from liability for the loss, damage or injury to
the property, as the shipper describes it in stating its value
for the purpose of determining for what the carrier shall
be accountable upon his undertaking, and what price the
shipper shall pay for the service and for the risk of loss
which the carrier assumes."
The court reached the conclusion that the provisions of the
Carmack amendment forbidding exemptions from liability is not
violated by a contract in an express receipt or bill of lading
limiting liability to an agreed value of $5o.o0. The Cummins
amendment undoubtedly attempted to prohibit such contracts by
the words "notwithstanding . . . (any) limitation of the
amount of recovery . . .. in any such receipt or bill of lad-
ing or any contract, rule, regulation, or in any tariff," etc.
Because of the close relation between the Carmack amendment
and the Cummins amendment the decisions under the former
may be taken as a safe guide for what will ultimately be deter-
mined by decisions under the latter, certainly in so far as the
latter reiterates the former. Congress had full and complete
power to legislate respecting the liability of common carriers."
Such enactments do not infringe any of the constitutional pro-
visions. 37 Such legislation supersedes all special regulations and
policies of states upon the subject and as well contracts of carriers
with respect thereto3"; but a state statute may for reasons of
internal policy by general statute provide for an attorney's fee
as a part of the costs and not infringe the Federal law, Congress
not having spoken on the subject.3 9 So far as the body of the
Cummins amendment is concerned transportation of a broader
'4 Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, 219 U. S. 186.
'Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills, supra, followed in Galveston,
Harrisburg & San Antonia R. R. Co. v. Wallace, 233 U. S. 481; Adams
Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491.
'Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, supra.
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Harris, 234 U. S. 412.
368 YALE LAW JOURNAL
kind will be subject to its provisions (as heretofore pointed out),
and carriers are prohibited from contracting in respect to the
"amount of recovery" in the interstate shipment of property,
but if the goods are hidden or concealed and the carrier is not
notified of the character of the goods and has elected to provide
graded rates therefor, the shipper may contract in writing in
respect to the amount of recov'ery by stating the value of the
goods as a part of the description and definition thereof.
JOHN B. DAISH.
DENvE, February, I916.
